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Executive Summary 
Background 
 
In July-August 2006, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
conducted a mission to Kosovo at the request of the Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
Coordinator (OKPCC). The purpose of the mission was to assess concerns raised by the 
HALO Trust that the extent of the remaining landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
contamination in Kosovo had been underestimated and, thus, provided an inadequate basis for 
future planning.  
 
The assessment team2 reviewed a sample of task dossiers, including all those identified as a 
concern by the HALO Trust. They found some problems with information management in the 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management section of OKPCC, but concluded that 
these problems were modest and had not led to a substantial underestimate of the remaining 
contamination problem. Accordingly, the assessment team concluded that the OKPCC and the 
EOD teams of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) had the capacity to address the remaining 
contamination.3  
 
The report provided 35 recommendations covering additional research and clean-up of files; 
improvements in information management procedures; re-surveys of sites for which 
documentation was incomplete; and strengthening of the mechanisms through which 
members of the public can report mines, UXO, and areas suspected of contamination.  
 
The last of the recommendations was that OKPCC should budget for a monitoring mission by 
the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or an external agency to assess progress in the 
implementation of the recommendations by the OKPCC EOD Management section. In early 
2007, the head of the OKPCC requested that GICHD conduct this follow-up mission. In 
addition to an assessment on the progress in implementing the recommendations from the 
earlier mission, GICHD was asked to review Failing the Kosovars – a report issued by the 
HALO Trust in December 2006 detailing their findings to that point from a rapid survey of 
mine and UXO affected regions of Kosovo – and to recommend steps the OKPCC might 
consider to address the issues raised in that report. 
 
The GICHD mounted its second assessment mission from 11-17 February, shortly after the 
UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, unveiled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement, which recommend what many analysts have termed ‘supervised self-rule.’ 
This will set in motion a broad transition of authority from organs of the international 
community (particularly the UN Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK – of which OKPCC is a part) 
to self-government authorities in Kosovo. This transition process has significant implications 
for the mine action programme in Kosovo. 
                                                
2
 While not part of the formal assessment team, representatives from HALO Trust participated in all aspects of 
the mission. 
3
 As will become apparent later in this document, the HALO Trust still believes that contamination is much more 
extensive than currently reflected in the OKPCC records. These conclusions were based on an assessment of 
errors or omissions in those records, and do not reflect evidence presented by HALO Trust some months later.  
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Progress in implementing recommendations  
 
The OKPCC EOD management team has made significant progress in implementing the 
recommendations of the previous report. Of the 35 recommendations made, complete or 
significant progress has been achieved for 32. More specifically: 
 
• ten have been fully implemented,  
• seventeen have been implemented, but the activities should be seen as an ongoing 
process (this aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD),  
• four are now being worked on, and  
• one has been implemented in part.  
 
This leaves only three recommendations4 on which minimal progress has yet to be achieved. 
However, the most important items are those directly affecting the population, and these 
recommendations were addressed without delay (some have been completed, while others 
require an on-going approach). The recommendations which have not been fully addressed to 
this point relate to documentation and office procedures. The information management 
function requires further attention and this report contains additional recommendations in this 
regard.  
 
As part of these recommendations, the OKPCC EOD Management section was asked to 
complete a systematic review of all task dossiers that had not been in the sample examined 
during the 2006 GICHD assessment mission. There are some task dossiers or individual 
documents that have not been located, for which on-going follow-up is required. If problems 
are identified that could affect the situation on the ground (e.g. incomplete clearance or 
discreditation reports for an area that the owner still considers suspicious), appropriate action 
needs to be taken. Where key documentation remains missing, these areas require re-survey to 
confirm there is no problem.  
 
The review of task dossiers also identified five areas that will eventually require clearance 
(one being a monitoring task5), and three that require technical survey (one being a 
monitoring task), as well as 12 areas for further community liaison or survey. The Table 
below summarises all changes in task lists resulting from (i) reviews of task dossiers, (ii) 
identification of new clearance tasks following technical survey, (iii) transfers of 
responsibility from another agency (KFOR, UNHCR, Serb Army, etc.) to KPC, etc. 
 
Table 1 – Changes in task lists: May 2006 to current 
 May 2006 August 2006 February 2007 
Current year list 16 12 8 
Future year list 16 22 25 
Monitoring list 5 12 13 
Total 37 46 46 
Completed tasks 5 11 
New tasks (i.e. added 
following tech. survey) 
14 11 
Changes 
from one 
period to the 
next  Net change +9 0 
 
Notes: Current year list = ongoing tasks + other tasks in current year work plan 
                                                
4
 See Annex C, Recommendations 22, 28, 30. 
5
 For the definition of ‘Monitoring Task’, see Recommendation 14 below 
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 Future year list = tasks that will need clearance in future years 
Monitoring list = tasks that cannot yet be undertaken (in KFOR area; technically infeasible, 
etc.) 
 
Summarizing, the systematic review of all task dossiers has not revealed significant unknown 
problems.  
Reassessment of the remaining threat 
 
The above Table does not incorporate the suspected dangerous areas (DAs) identified through 
the recent survey by HALO Trust. It is impossible at this early stage to generate firm 
estimates on the amount of additional clearance work that may arise from this source. OKPCC 
and Mines Awareness Trust (MAT)6 surveyors have made preliminary visits to the majority 
of the sites identified in Failing the Kosovars. For some, they felt it unlikely that a real 
problem would be found; for others, a technical survey would be required. This may yet prove 
optimistic, but the vast majority of DAs in Kosovo do not pose a serious threat to life and 
limb, and do not constrain overall or community-level development (i.e. the DAs would 
properly be characterised as low priority). In particular, the majority of the DAs identified by 
the HALO Trust are suspected minefields, but there has not been a landmine accident 
involving humans reported in Kosovo in over two years.7  
Reassessment of capacity 
 
Even if the true extent of contamination is more extensive than previously understood, its 
impact remains modest. An appropriate strategy might simply be to extend the duration of the 
programme rather than to further increase capacity. However, if Kosovo authorities decide 
that the capacities of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) EOD teams should be further 
augmented, it would be easy to accomplish this. The performance of the OKPCC EOD 
Management section in implementing recommendations arising from the 2006 GICHD 
mission has been excellent, and it (along with MAT surveyors) has made preliminary visits to 
the majority of the suspected DAs identified in the HALO Trust survey. The EOD 
Management section seems quite capable of coordinating the demining programme, even if 
the number of KPC teams is expanded. Increasing the number of KPC teams is a rather 
straightforward capacity development challenge. KPC has a good work record – no accidents, 
no missed mine incidents and seemingly good productivity – all of which indicates capable 
management and supervision. As well, there are large numbers of experienced deminers in 
Kosovo whose training could be refreshed quickly. 
 
An alternative strategy would be to re-accredit HALO Trust’s demining teams to make more 
rapid progress in clearing the remaining contamination. At first glance, this seems an 
attractive option as HALO Trust is a capable operator with extensive experience in Kosovo, 
and because it would mobilise its own funding. However, this neglects the difficult relations 
that prevail between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS. Unless these relations were 
first healed, the potential benefits from maintaining HALO capacity would be counter-
balanced, in part at least, by ‘coordination failure’ costs stemming from the inflamed relations 
among the organisations. Given the long history of antipathy8 and the existing levels of 
                                                
6
 MAT is working on the second year of a two-year agreement funded by the EC to maintain two survey teams to 
assist OKPCC and KPC. 
7
 The survey conducted by HALO Trust has documented claims of a number of landmine accidents involving 
cattle, plus one involving a tractor and one in 2005 involving a child. These claims had not previously been 
reported to OKPCC and, therefore, had not been investigated by the EOD Management Unit. 
8
 See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002. 
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mutual mistrust, the success of this approach would depend on whether the organisations 
involved could make credible commitments to maintain an effective working relationship.  
Enhancing planning and local ownership 
 
Regardless of the technical merits of alternative approaches to the remaining contamination, 
at this stage in the evolution of Kosovo, the appropriate mine action strategy should not be 
determined in isolation; rather, the level of demining services should be decided as part of a 
broader planning and budgeting process that allocates the human and financial resources 
available over the medium-term among the many demands on Kosovo’s financial resources. 
Mechanisms for doing this within the Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG) 
already exist and are being further strengthened.  
 
Accordingly, this would be an appropriate time for OKPCC to formulate a multi-year 
strategic plan outlining how it plans to address the remaining landmine and UXO problem 
over the medium term. This plan should eventually be submitted to the authorities of Kosovo 
for endorsement and for incorporation into their medium-term planning and budgeting 
processes. The multi-year strategy will also provide a basis for more detailed annual work 
plans, which also should be submitted to the authorities of Kosovo as part of the standard 
budget cycle. 
Conclusions  
 
While the full extent of landmine and UXO contamination in Kosovo cannot be determined 
with precision at this time, and may be greater than earlier anticipated, landmines and UXO 
are not a significant constraint on development and sustainable livelihoods in Kosovo. No 
landmine accidents involving humans have been reported to OKPCC in over two years. 
Accident statistics indicate that UXO and abandoned munitions pose a modest threat to the 
population, but most accidents appear to be the result of handling.9 The elimination of this 
threat requires not only clearance of cluster munitions and other UXO, but also the reduction 
of stockpiles of munitions held by the Kosovar population.10 Until this is achieved, mine risk 
education (MRE) and clearance efforts should be continued.  
 
The OKPCC EOD Management section has made excellent progress in implementing the 
recommendations arising from the 2006 mission. Due to their efforts, and this latest 
assessment, further opportunities for performance improvements have been identified.  
 
The OKPCC EOD Management section, assisted by the MAT, has also made progress in 
preliminary assessments of the suspected DAs reported by the HALO Trust. Their initial 
assessment is that the HALO Trust survey will not alter the contamination picture in a 
fundamental way, and that existing and planned capacities will be adequate to address 
Kosovo’s contamination problem over the medium term. This assessment seems reasonable, 
                                                
9
 In at least some cases, the cause of these accidents have been recorded as ‘tampering’, which implies some 
intention on the part of the victim. As many of these accidents involved young children, ‘tampering’ is not an 
appropriate term.  
10
 There have been reports of stockpiles found by KFOR raids, and of caches in inaccessible areas along the 
border with Albania and Macedonia. It would be unsurprising that Kosovars from both major communities kept 
stockpiles given the political status of the province remains contested, but it is unclear how significant these are. 
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but cannot be considered definitive. Technical surveys will have to be conducted on most of 
the DAs reported by HALO and clearance will certainly be required for some.11 
 
Plans for the expansion of KPC EOD teams are now being implemented. As a result, KPC 
EOD capacity will increase by about 60% compared to 2006. In addition, financing is in place 
for contracting mine detection dog (MDD) teams if that proves warranted.12  
 
Given the strained relations between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS, it is hard 
to gauge the net benefits that might accrue through the extension of HALO Trust’s 
accreditation for demining. The additional demining capacities might help, but the mutual 
mistrust and, hence, lack of a common vision, strategy, and purpose would be a hindrance.  
 
The Kosovo mine action plan lacks a multi-year strategic plan which, among other things, 
complicates the analysis of alternative proposals over a medium term planning horizon. In 
addition, the annual work plans are inadequate, which (among other things) makes it difficult  
to determine from the otherwise valuable annual reports whether the objectives set for the 
year were achieved. 
 
Opportunities exist for bolstering local ownership in preparation for an eventual transfer of 
responsibility for the mine action programme to self-government authorities in Kosovo. One 
important step would be the submission of strategic and annual work plans to Kosovar 
authorities for discussion and endorsement. 
 
A final accounting of the international mine action response to the Kosovo crisis cannot be 
done at this point in time.13 Such an assessment should be done two or three years from now 
as this will certainly yield important lessons for mine action, and for the international 
community more generally. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1 
The OKPCC should develop a multi-year strategic plan for the Kosovo mine action 
programme.14 
 
Recommendation 2 
The OKPCC should formulate annual work plans based on the multi-year strategic 
plan, and incorporating new information that arises over time. 
 
Recommendation 3 
                                                
11
 There remains a debate on the specific survey procedures that should be used before declaring that a suspected 
area represents no apparent risk. This is particularly critical when assessing minefields or cluster bomb strikes 
that have already been cleared (perhaps partially) or where mines have been ‘lifted’, leaving, if anything, very 
low density contamination without a clear pattern. The assessment team did not review field operations and 
cannot comment on whether the technical survey methods now employed are appropriate in all cases. 
12
 There are many sites in Kosovo for which MDD would not be an asset. 
13
 One key issue is whether a survey needs to be conducted toward the end of the emergency response campaign 
to provide a basis for an exit strategy. This cannot be determined until more is known about the suspected DAs 
arising from the HALO Survey. 
14
 A possible outline for a strategic plan is appended as Annex D. 
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Following the approval of the Strategic Plan and each of the annual work plans by 
UNMIK or its successor organisations representing the international community, the 
plans should be presented to the cabinet of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG), or its successor institutions, for endorsement. 
 
Recommendation 4 
As part of its strategic and annual planning, the OKPCC should identify capacity gaps 
within the mine action programme relating, in particular, to new capability 
requirements (e.g. strategic planning) or the transition to self-government authority 
(e.g. need for a national authority, mine action legislation, etc.), and then identify 
possible sources of capacity development assistance (e.g. UNMAS).  
 
Recommendation 5 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should compile statistical data to assist in work 
planning. These might include: 
 
• how many new DAs are reported per months/year, with what result,  
• average sizes of DAs and person days worked on each.  
 
Recommendation 6 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should compile and maintain depreciation 
schedules for OKPCC and KPC equipment to assist in annual and medium-term 
planning. 
 
Recommendation 7 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should write Standard Work Procedures (SWP) 
covering: 
 
• response to requests for assistance;  
• priority setting for clearance, and 
• information management procedures. (Note: The GICHD IMSMA officer for 
Europe will soon be in Kosovo and may assist in this regard). 
 
Recommendation 8 
Tasks with missing documents in the dossier or IMSMA irregularities should be 
included on the survey list, and be visited when other surveys are being conducted in 
the area, until documentation is complete and the task is closed. 
 
Recommendation 9 
Whenever surveys are conducted, the affected person(s) and local authorities should 
sign a form to confirm the work that has been done and, when appropriate, their 
acceptance that no obvious threat from landmines/UXO remains at that site. 
 
Recommendation 10 
Technical survey reports should include sketches of cleared areas, even if nothing 
was found and the area was discredited 
 
Recommendation 11 
  vii 
Ensure that individuals can report UXO or suspected dangerous areas without lengthy 
or needlessly intrusive interrogations by police or other officials, so citizens are not 
deterred from reporting these dangers to public welfare. 
 
Recommendation 12 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should visit the Kosovo Police Services (KPS) 
detachment in Suva Reka to assess why suspected DA reports from Lubovci village 
have not been forwarded to OKPCC, rectify the problem, and assess whether further 
outreach to the KPS more generally may be warranted to ensure all DAs are reported 
promptly. 
 
Recommendation 13 
Multi-year plans for community liaison and surveys should be formulated to ensure 
systematic and proactive community liaison and survey work takes place.15 
 
Recommendation 14 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should differentiate between “Future Tasks” 
and “Monitoring Tasks” as per definitions along the following lines: 
 
• Future task = a task that should be undertaken in a future time period, for 
which there is no impediment to clearance 
• Monitoring task = a task that cannot or should not be undertaken unless 
there is a change in situation (e.g. KFOR relinquishes responsibility for an 
area; land use change; etc.)16 
 
Recommendation 15 
In its progress and annual reports, the OKPCC EOD Management section should 
differentiate between implanted mines cleared from a minefield, mines abandoned but 
not implanted, mines destroyed from stockpiles, and mines delivered by a civilian. 
 
Recommendation 16 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should continue the steps it has already 
initiated to assess all information provided by the HALO Trust as a result of its survey 
and further integrate it into work plans for 2007 and future years.  
 
Recommendation 17 
The OKPCC EOD Management section should (i) write future SWP and Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOP) in Albanian, and ask KPC and MAT for survey reports in 
Albanian to ensure these can be understood by local personnel,17 and (ii) should 
initiate a programme to translate existing documents into Albanian. 
 
Recommendation 18 
                                                
15
 These should be incorporated into the multi-year strategic plan as per recommendation 1. 
16
 The purpose of this refined nomenclature is to allow an assessment of progress relative to BOTH (i) the total 
number of tasks and (ii) the number of tasks on which the OKPCC has the authority to work. 
17
 This could start with the SOP for SM systems, and writing could be delegated to EOD qualified KPC staff. 
  viii 
The OKPCC should budget for periodic monitoring missions by an outside agency to 
assess progress in implementing the recommendations contained in this report. The 
next mission should coincide with the preparation of the Annual Work Plan for 2008. 
 
  1 
Introduction 
 
Context 
 
In 1999, an internal conflict between the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led to a UN Security Council resolution authorising an 
intervention by NATO forces. An extensive NATO bombing campaign led to a cease fire in 
June 1999, following which Security Council resolution 1244 authorised the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to establish an interim civilian 
administration to, inter alia: 
 
• coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;  
• assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons; 
• promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;  
• facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status.  
 
Shortly thereafter, the Security Council instructed UNMIK to …establish, as soon as possible, 
a Mine Action Centre to deal with the threat posed to the returnees and internally displaced 
persons by landmines and unexploded ordnance.18 The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
subsequently established the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC). In addition 
to coordinating the many mine action organisations providing demining, explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), and mine risk education (MRE) services, the MACC developed an exit and 
transition strategy in which, in mid-December 2001: 
 
• the Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC) assumed responsibility as the focal 
point for all matters pertaining to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Kosovo; 
• the demining battalion of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) assumed 
responsibility for mine clearance and EOD.  
 
Provision was made for international technical advisors to support both the OKPCC EOD 
section and the KPC, but the majority of international demining operators were instructed to 
shut-down their activities and leave further clearance work to the KPC. Some of these 
organisations, including the HALO Trust, questioned whether it was an appropriate time for 
them to exit.19 Over time, some additional dangerous areas (DAs) have, in fact, come to light, 
which led OKPCC to issue a contract to the Mine Action Trust (MAT) to provide two teams 
to conduct technical surveys of the known and suspected DAs. As well, the HALO Trust 
resumed clearance operations in Kosovo in 2004. 
 
UNMAS conducted an assessment of the remaining mines/UXO problem in May 2006, and 
concluded that …the KPC explosive ordnance disposal teams will be capable of addressing 
the residual landmine and UXO threat in Kosovo and beyond.20  
 
                                                
18
 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244 
(1999), 12 June 1999. 
19
 See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002.  
20
 Letter of transmittal from Maxwell Gaylard to Major General Chris Steirn, OKPCC, for the  Report on the 
Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006: Situation Analysis and Evaluation of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
Capacity to Address the Problem, 14 May 2006. 
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Background to the Assessment 
 
In mid-2006, the OKPCC requested the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) carry out an assessment of the mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
operations in Kosovo, with a focus on information management functions. This request 
stemmed from criticisms levelled by the HALO Trust that – whether through errors of 
omission or commission – the OKPCC and UNMAS had understated the extent of the 
landmine and UXO contamination remaining in Kosovo and, therefore, had incorrectly 
concluded that the KPC EOD teams had adequate capacity to address the problem. The 
GICHD mounted that mission in July-August 2006. 
 
HALO Trust representatives participated in all activities undertaken during the 2006 
assessment mission and, during the debriefing at the end of that mission, they concurred with 
all of the recommendations arising from the assessment, including:  
 
• while OKPCC records were not perfect, omissions were minor and related to 
remote, low priority tasks which do not require immediate action; 
• nothing in the review of records suggested a revision was required to the UNMAS 
assessment that: 
o mines/UXO represented only a modest threat to the population, and do 
not seriously impede movement or socio-economic development; 
o there did not appear to be a large unknown problem with mines and 
UXO, and the existing and planned capacities of KPC appeared 
adequate to address the remaining problem;21  
• the OKPCC and KPC should be more proactive to ensure that they receive all DA 
reports on a timely basis. This should be a continuous survey process conducted by 
local personnel.22  
 
This last point addressed the proposal to conduct a rapid re-survey of Kosovo, which had just 
been advanced by the HALO Trust. Subsequently, the head of the OKPCC wrote the director 
of HALO Trust stating that approval to proceed with survey was not granted. Regardless, the 
HALO Trust did go ahead with a survey and, in December, released a report entitled Failing 
the Kosovars, which detailed its findings to that point. This report was widely distributed.23 
 
In early 2007, the OKPCC requested that the GICHD conduct a follow-up mission. The 
Terms of Reference (TORs – see Annex A) from OKPCC specified an assessment of progress 
in implementing the recommendations of the 2006 exercise. Additionally, the GICHD was 
asked to consider the Failing the Kosovars report and provide recommendations on actions 
the OKPCC might consider in light of that report. Two GICHD staff members, Ted Paterson 
and Vera Bohle, undertook this mission from 11-17 February 2007. 
 
Other Developments 
 
While controversies among mine action organisations continued and may even have 
intensified in the period between the two GICHD missions, critical developments also 
occurred on the political front. In early February 2007, the UN special envoy, Martti 
                                                
21
 HALO Trust representatives did state that they believed there was some unrecorded contamination. 
22
 The full list of recommendations are contained in the report from GICHD, Assessment into Operational 
Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo, 14 September 2006, and in Appendix C of this report. 
23
 During the latest GICHD mission, HALO Trust representatives distributed a follow-up report detailing 
additional findings from its survey, which had resumed in January 2007. 
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Ahtisaari, unveiled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which 
recommend what many analysts have termed ‘supervised self-rule.’ While the full document 
will be presented officially to the UN Security Council (expected in the latter half of March 
2007), the general provisions of the Settlement are well known. These covers a range of issues 
including a constitution enshrining human rights, the protection of religious and cultural 
heritage, and decentralization, as well as provisions on justice, economic development, and 
security. The recommendations also provide for a continuing international presence.24 The 
key provisions for mine action relate to the security sector, including: 
 
• The establishment of a new Kosovo Security Council, reporting to the Prime 
Minister, 
• The establishment of a new Kosovo Security Force (KSF), with initial 
responsibility for crisis response, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and civil 
protection,  
• The disbanding of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).25  
 
The final decision on the Status Settlement rests with the UN Security Council. Assuming it 
approves, UNMIK’s existing mandates will remain unchanged for 120 days, the day after 
which all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK will be transferred to the 
authorities in Kosovo. The precise status of KPC (until it is disbanded) and of OKPCC 
remains somewhat unclear, as does the process for the eventual transfer of security sector 
responsibilities to a new Ministry of Defence.26 
 
Methodology 
 
In addition to reviewing background documents, the assessment team conducted a mission to 
Kosovo from 11-17 February to conduct interviews with personnel in OKPCC and its EOD 
Management section, and with representatives from UNMIK, OSCE, the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), KPC, Mine Action Trust (MAT), and the HALO 
Trust.27 They also reviewed: 
 
• Task Dossiers with outstanding actions recommended (following the relevant sections 
of the September 2006 report) 
• The survey work undertaken (following Annex C of the 2006 report) 
• The list of Future Tasks 
• Various documents prepared by the head of the OKPCC EOD section concerning 
actions taken to implement the recommendations 
• Failing the Kosovars and the actions taken by OKPCC EOD and MAT as a result of 
that report. 
 
As well, the assessment team visited the KPC EOD teams at their training facility and various 
sites in the Dulje Pass area.  
                                                
24
 The Status Settlement proposes (i) an International Civilian Representative (who will also serve as the EU 
Special Representative) with ultimate supervisory authority over the implementation of the Settlement, (ii) a 
European Security and Defence Policy Mission to ‘monitor, mentor, and advise on all areas related to the rule of 
law’, and a NATO-led International Military Presence 
25
 The KSF will be formed and staffed, and the KPC disbanded, within one year of the adoption of the 
Settlement. 
26
 KPC has always been a ‘reserved competency’ of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
27
 A full list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex B. 
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Progress in Implementing the Recommendations 
 
During the 2006 assessment visit, a sample of task dossiers held by the EOD Management 
Section were reviewed to ensure appropriate action had been undertaken to either clear or 
cancel tasks, or to designate them for future clearance by the KPC. The purpose of this 
exercise was to (i) assess whether errors and omissions in DA records had led to an under-
estimate of the remaining mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, and (ii) in light of the 
findings, assess whether the existing and planned KPC EOD capacity was adequate. The 
assessment concluded that OKPCC/KPC EOD is in a position to handle the remaining 
problems, but provided a number of recommendations to address various shortcomings 
identified. The degree of implementation of the recommendations is summarized below, with 
the details provided in Annex C. 
 
The OKPCC EOD management team has made significant progress in implementing the 
recommendations of the previous report. Of the 35 recommendations made: 
 
• ten28 have been fully implemented,  
• seventeen29 have been implemented, but the activities should be seen as an ongoing 
process (this aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD),  
• four30 are being worked on, and  
• one31 has been partly met.  
 
This leaves only three recommendations32 on which minimal progress has yet to be achieved. 
However, a numeric summary of progress is inadequate as some recommendations are more 
important than others. The most important items are those directly affecting the population, 
and these recommendations were addressed without delay (some have been completed, while 
others require an on-going approach).  
 
The recommendations which have not been fully addressed to this point relate to 
documentation and office procedures. The information management function requires further 
attention and this report contains additional recommendations in this regard.  
 
On balance, given that only six months have elapsed since the last mission, the OKPCC EOD 
section has made excellent progress. 
 
Concerning the review and analysis of all task dossiers, the OKPCC EOD has done thorough 
work to complete the information contained in both the task dossiers and IMSMA, and to 
reconcile these records (details in Annex C). The further review of task dossiers has not 
identified significant unknown problems. There are, however, still some task dossiers or 
individual documents that have not been located. On-going follow-up is still required. If 
problems are identified that could affect the situation on the ground (e.g. incomplete clearance 
or discreditation reports for an area that the owner still considers suspicious), appropriate 
action needs to be taken. Where key documentation remains missing, these areas require re-
survey to confirm there is no problem.  
                                                
28
 Recommendations 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 29, 32 
29
 Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35 
30
 Recommendations 1, 11, 14, 31 
31
 Recommendation 21 
32
 Recommendations 22, 28, 30 
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Following the recommendation of the previous GICHD report, OKPCC conducted a 
systematic review of all Task Dossiers and compared them with the data contained in 
IMSMA, in order to identify further areas for future action. As a result, 12 areas have been 
identified for further community liaison or survey, plus five areas that require clearance (one 
being a monitoring task at this point), and three that require technical survey (one only being a 
monitoring task).33 Taking all information together, the updated tabular overview of future 
tasks reads as follows: 
 
Table 2 – Summary of Future Tasks 
2007 mission34 Source of task 
information ▼ 
2006 
mission Completed KPC Tasks for 2007 
Future KPC 
Tasks 
Monitoring 
Tasks 
OKPCC/UNMAS list 
Future Tasks 16 
2 
C 09-12 
DA 2538 
2 
E 09-07 
C 22-11 
1135 1 S 20-42 
OKPCC/UNMAS list 
Ongoing Tasks 11 536 
2 
C 18-66 
C 19-12 
437  
OKPCC/UNMAS list 
“Monitoring” 5
38
 
 139 140 341 
OKPCC/UNMAS list 
modification   1
42
   
New DA on list 1 
 
1 
C 18-64 
243 
 
 
Additional Future 
Tasks identified in 
IMSMA 
6 3
44
 
 
1 
DA 4308 
2, but two DAs 
are same => 
145 
 
Low priority sub-
surface 7    7
46
 
Additional Tasks 
identified via OKPCC 
IMSMA & Task dossier 
research 
 
  647 
2 
N 11-12 
N 11-13 
8 25 13 Totals 46 10 Total at end of 2007 mission = 46 
                                                
33
 See Annex C for details. 
34
 It needs to be considered that the KPC teams have been in training during the GICHD visit. Some of these 
tasks will become “ongoing” as soon as the operations start again. 
35
 W 01-46, C 09-13, C 18-13, C 18-68, N 11-09, N 29-01, DA 4317, W 01-10, W 02-37, W 02-86, W 17-22 
36
 C 19-34, W 01-36, W 01-48, S 16-08, S 20-12 
37
 S 20-48, W 01-47, W 02-84, W 17-16 
38
 C 19-29 (KFOR), C 19-35 (UNHCR), N 11-05 (Serb Army Task), N 28-01 (KFOR), E 25-25 (KPC Training 
Area) 
39
 C 19-35 had been UNHCR area, now UNHCR requested clearance.  
40
 E 2525. KPC will start construction in their training area, and some prior clearance will be required 
41
 KFOR: C 19-29, N 28-01; Serb Army: N 11-05 
42
 S 24-29, was listed as completed but only some DAs had been completed, others require further clearance (this 
is the Dulje Pass dossier). 
43
 DA 2958, following KFOR report; W 02-52, following MAT report 
44
 DAs 3943, 4325, 3880 
45
 DAs 2550 and 2756 
46
 E 25-58, S 20-18, S 20-23, E 25-56, W 02-27, S 20-04, W 02-49 
47
 C 18-12, C 19-07, C 22-12, E 04-09, W 02-76, DA 4307 
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The eight tasks listed for KPC clearance in 2007 represent only the starting position and it is 
expected that more tasks can be completed in the course of the year. The OKPCC reports that 
all future task areas are marked or fenced and have little or no socio-economic impact on the 
communities. For this reason, their clearance can be delayed should more urgent tasks be 
identified. The tasks listed in the column “Monitoring Tasks” either: 
 
• are not a priority for clearance at this stage, but may become so if the land use 
changes, or  
• fall under another agency’s jurisdiction (e.g. KFOR).  
 
This list does not include survey tasks or the community requests brought forward by the 
HALO Trust, as the latter require a verification survey prior to submission of a Dangerous 
Area report. Only then will the areas be entered into IMSMA and added to the future task list. 
Details on the ongoing survey are described in the following chapter.  
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Updated Assessment of the Risks Posed by Mines/UXO 
 
In mine action, risk is a function of (i) the technical threat posed by a device and (ii) the 
likelihood of someone triggering a device. 
 
The technical threat posed by landmines and UXO is, of course, substantial and need not be 
covered here. The likelihood of an accident increases with: 
 
• ignorance concerning the locations of landmines and UXO 
• extent of actual contamination (more dangerous areas implies more risk) and its 
proximity to inhabited or utilised areas 
• the socio-economic impact of each suspected48 DA (i.e. does the DA constrain 
development or block access to assets that are vital for local livelihoods) 
 
The first issue can be addressed by MRE, minefield fencing and marking, etc. Such measures 
have been extensively applied in Kosovo, and need not be discussed here. The following 
sections discuss, first, the extent and, second, the impact of the contamination. 
 
Extent of the Contamination 
 
The simple fact that HALO’s proactive survey has led to additional reports of suspect areas 
comes as little surprise to anyone familiar with mine action in Kosovo. Some reported 
minefields may have been incorrectly declared safe following a clearance operation or a 
survey. Some minefields were never recorded and are not discovered until someone sees a 
mine or there is an accident to a person or animal. Records of cluster bomb strikes can be 
inaccurate and the actual sites may not be confirmed until local residents see CBUs. In 
addition, much of the terrain of Kosovo is mountainous, heavily forested, or otherwise 
difficult to access. As the road system improves and the economic ‘footprints’ of communities 
expand due to population increases, economic growth, or depletion of the most accessible 
natural resources (e.g. trees and game), individuals range farther a-field and uncover 
previously unknown areas that are contaminated with explosive devices.  
 
In addition, the ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms for reporting dangerous areas from communities to 
OKPCC have been imperfect, for a variety of reasons. Local government was disrupted by the 
war and it took some time before new mechanisms introduced by the international community 
began to function reasonably well. The fact that criminal charges have been laid against 
people found in possession of illegal weapons and munitions means that some people are now 
afraid to report dangerous items to the authorities. People engaged in illegal hunting or 
woodcutting (often the individuals most likely to discover explosive devices in remote areas) 
are naturally reticent to report their finds to authorities.49 Thus, some people may know of 
areas contaminated by explosives which they have not yet reported through, or have been 
stuck at some point within, official channels. Such areas might well be reported to an NGO 
conducting a proactive survey.50  
                                                
48
 Suspected DAs that do not actually contain landmines/UXO do not pose a danger to live and limb, but may 
still have an adverse socio-economic impact if people are afraid to use vital livelihood assets. 
49
 Our last report noted these issues and recommended that OKPCC initiate a more concerted outreach 
programme to strengthen reporting from communities, and the steps taken by OKPCC are outlined in Annex C. 
50
 In many mine-affected countries, nationwide surveys have already been conducted to obtain a complete as 
possible picture of the suspected contamination. This had not been done in Kosovo. Presumably, this was 
because there were extensive records from the warring parties and, by the end of 2001, it was believed that the 
bulk of the contamination had been cleared, leaving only ‘residual’ contamination (i.e. small or remote areas) 
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However, the scale of the problem reported by the HALO Trust is a surprise. Failing the 
Kosovars included 58 DAs (51 of which were suspected minefields), and the update report 
has another 24 DAs. By HALO’s estimation (combining the already known tasks on OKPCC 
lists plus the suspected DAs HALO has reported), mine clearance is required for 1,890,000 m2 
in 72 DAs (an average of over 25,000 m2 per DA), with another 55 DAs requiring BAC. 51, 52  
 
However, these estimates are based on general survey techniques, and it is impossible at this 
stage for the Evaluation Team to determine how accurate the estimates will prove to be. A 
worldwide problem for the mine action field is the fact that general surveys have generated 
estimates of suspected hazards that overstate the problem, often by enormous amounts. 
HALO Trust personnel advised the Evaluation Team that it applied stringent internal quality 
control measures to avoid overstating the problem. Regardless, the areas that will eventually 
require clearance can only be established after further investigations. 
  
Furthermore, the likelihood that landmines or other sub-surface munitions are actually present 
needs to be re-assessed before expensive clearance assets are assigned to a task. For example, 
there have been numerous sites in Kosovo where landmines or other munitions have been 
dumped at some point after the conflict. Because of the insecurity in Kosovo and 
neighbouring countries, individuals and militias have stockpiled munitions (including unused 
mines and those ‘lifted’ from implanted minefields). Efforts by KFOR to collect these 
munitions, including house searches and charges against those found stockpiling munitions, 
mean that some people abandon dangerous items in a field rather than report them to 
authorities.  
 
As well, proactive surveys – in all sectors, not simply mine action – must cope with the fact 
that some individuals have incentives to report problems which do not exist. For example, 
people may hope for compensation if they report the loss of livestock due to landmines, or if 
they are denied safe access to their property by suspected landmines. Others may have caches 
of munitions that they want to dispose in a remote area, and want to arrange for a clearance 
agency to dispose of the dangerous items as quickly as possible. Others may wish to spread 
rumours that areas are dangerous so they are free to hunt or exploit the timber without 
competition. In some cases in Kosovo, rural families want to remain in the urban areas in 
which they sought refuge during the war, and have reported that their lands are contaminated 
to delay eviction.  
 
In Kosovo and elsewhere, many individuals will also remain fearful of land even after it has 
been cleared or deemed safe. Sometimes this is due to ignorance about the clearance or survey 
work undertaken, but, for some particularly risk-averse people, no assurances will convince 
                                                                                                                                                   
that could be addressed on a responsive basis (as remains true today in virtually all European countries). If the 
results of the HALO survey turn out to be accurate to a significant degree, then clearly the policy for future 
operations should be to conduct a nationwide survey before the exit of the bulk of the clearance capacity. 
51
 Figures in e-mail from Matthew Hovell, 16 February 2007. The square metre estimates incorporate significant 
known areas that the KPC and civilian demining organisations cannot work on because they are designated as 
KFOR or Serb Army responsibilities, or (for cluster bomb sites) the priority is so low that clearance should only 
be done if there is a change of land use. OKPCC does not currently generate square metre for clearance tasks. 
52
 In its comments on the draft version of this report, HALO Trust reported the following as of 24 May 2007:  
 
 Minefield DAs Cluster Munitions DAs 
Community Requests 86 23 
Area requiring clearance (m²) 2,097,110 2,100,000 
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them their properties are safe. As well, people hear rumours of dangerous areas or learn 
second hand of reports that mines have been found, and assume there is an implanted 
minefield, although the mines may have been dumped on the surface recently.   
 
Finally, the very process of surveying may generate unfounded fears; people might conclude 
quite reasonably that if the mine action professionals keep visiting and asking questions, there 
must be more minefields in the vicinity.53  
 
Even when a technical survey confirms that a problem exists or is likely, further 
investigations including consultations with local informants, often enables the area requiring 
clearance to be reduced by significant amounts.54  
 
The Evaluation Team met with surveyors from OKPCC and MAT who made follow-up visits 
to the majority of sites identified in Failing the Kosovars.55 In some cases they found the local 
information to be suspicious.56 In others they concluded that those who reported to HALO are 
fearful due to ignorance about the clearance that had taken place, or because they didn’t 
believe the clearance was adequate. In such cases, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors felt that a 
visit by a community liaison team would be an appropriate first response.  
 
Conversely, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors did conclude that some of the areas reported in 
Failing the Kosovars would require some clearance following a technical survey to establish 
the precise perimeters of the DA. In the majority of cases however, the surveyors 
recommended a Technical Survey to validate or discredit the DA report. Based on their past 
experience within Kosovo, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors believed that some of these areas 
would be discredited or the problem would be resolved by spot clearance by the Technical 
Survey teams.57 However, there is no certainty that future results will conform to past 
experience and each DA needs to be judged on the evidence on the ground. 
 
In summary, it is no surprise that the total suspect area is significantly larger than contained in 
the current OKPCC task list. The recent surveying by HALO Trust suggests the problem may 
prove more extensive than most informed observers had previously thought likely, but at the 
time of the mission it was impossible to determine by how much. More accurate assessments 
will have to await the technical surveys planned by OKPCC once the demining season starts 
for 2007.58 
 
                                                
53
 This is well documented in other countries where, for example, development agencies have demanded 
clearance of sites when there is no reason to believe – other than the presence of demining operators in the 
vicinity – that those sites have ever been contaminated.  
54
 Some tasks will also be increased if devices are discovered toward the boundaries of the area originally set for 
clearance. 
55
 OKPCC sent its QA and Community Liaison (CL) Officers: MAT its Operations officer and CL officers, 
accompanied by one KPC officer, sometimes supported  by medics or deminers. The teams included both men 
and women, which can assist in getting information from a wider range of informants.  
56
 This is not to say the HALO Trust teams have misreported. OKPCC and MAT survey personnel are extremely 
experienced and they may know specific communities and individual informants better than their counterparts in 
HALO. In other cases, the OKPCC and MAT surveyors may have met with additional residents from the local 
communities who provided conflicting information. 
57
 Once again, there may be no technical survey procedures that yield conclusive results for some low density 
minefields or for minefields where the ‘pattern’ has been broken because mines have been lifted. The 
Assessment Team did not conduct a review of technical survey operations. 
58
 Technical survey follow-up will be conducted by two 10 person MAT teams. 
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Impact of the Suspected Contamination 
 
Failing the Kosovars and the subsequent survey work by HALO suggests the remaining 
contamination problem – particularly from landmines – might prove to be more extensive 
than previously anticipated. But how intensive is the impact of this contamination on safety, 
livelihoods, and economic development more generally? 
 
There is strong evidence that landmines pose only a modest threat to lives and limbs. Simply 
put, there has not been a single landmine accident involving a person in over two years. This 
also suggests that the threat has only a limited impact on livelihoods. Landmine accidents 
result from ignorance or from risk-taking behaviour to exploit assets that are important to a 
household’s livelihood. The absence of landmine accidents for an extended period suggests 
some combination of the following: 
 
• Kosovars in local communities are aware of the location of suspected minefields in their 
vicinity and these minefields do not block access to essential assets, 
or 
• the reported minefields do not exist.59   
 
This is not to suggest that explosive contamination has no impact on Kosovars. According to 
the reports compiled by HALO Trust, a number of Kosovars have lost livestock in landmine 
accidents, which would represent a serious loss to many rural households. Suspected 
minefields also deny access to land and other assets (timber, game, etc.) which, undoubtedly, 
some local residents would wish to use. However, the absence of accidents from landmines 
for an extended period suggests that the people affected have alternatives. Further, the pattern 
of accidents in recent years indicates that UXO (particularly cluster munitions) and 
abandoned munitions (particularly grenades) represent a far greater danger to lives and limbs 
than do landmines. 
 
More generally, there is significant evidence that mines and UXO are not viewed as one of the 
principal threats to the security of Kosovars. The 2006 internal security sector review (ISSR) 
found that …high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty 
have created an atmosphere of insecurity. Economic instability has exacerbated problems 
such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in 
mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both international and indigenous… the 
greatest security challenge lies in promoting economic development. (ISSR, xiii) This 
suggests strongly that landmines, UXO, and other threats to human security should be viewed 
in a holistic manner rather than in isolation, as stand-alone activities. The scale of the 
response to the landmine and UXO threat needs now to be determined in light of the resources 
available for enhancing human security more generally. Ideally, this determination should be 
made in large part by self-government authorities in Kosovo. 
  
In summary, while the extent of the contamination in Kosovo may prove larger than earlier 
anticipated, its impact on people and communities remains modest. It would be improper to 
characterise the contamination as either a humanitarian crisis or a serious impediment to 
                                                
59
 This would be consistent with the findings from last summer’s OSCE survey on the threat of landmines and 
UXO, which found: Kosovo wide, the impact the UXO threat appears to have upon the population can best be 
described as minimal…and…UXO will remain a threat in this region for many years to come but the impact it 
has on the population appears to be decreasing year by year towards a negligible amount. However, one cannot 
safely conclude on the basis of aggregated data showing  the average person is relatively unconcerned about 
landmines and UXO that no individuals, households, or communities are heavily impacted. 
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either livelihoods or economic development. Given the fairly remote or inaccessible locations 
of many of the suspected DAs listed in the HALO reports, classifying them as ‘high priority’ 
for clearance is likely to cause confusion among many readers, as this term normally signifies 
a task which is both important (in term of risk reduction and development benefits) and 
urgent.  
 
Textbox 1 – Setting Priorities in Mine Action 
Because there are never enough resources to do everything people might wish for in a particular 
period of time, priorities must be established. There are many different approaches used to set 
priorities in mine action, but most these are based on some combination of the following criteria 
(this example for demining tasks): 
 
1. likely benefits from clearance in terms of: 
a. risk reduction – removing threats to lives and limbs, and 
b. development – promoting economic growth and poverty reduction 
2. urgency or timeliness – is the benefit dependent on the demining being completed in the 
short-term? For example, it may be that a road reconstruction project cannot be initiated until 
a DA is cleared, but there is no funding available to reconstruct the road next year regardless 
of whether the DA is cleared. Therefore, the clearance of that DA is not a priority, at least 
within the coming year.N1 
 
In the initial years of a mine action programme, priority-setting is often done by ‘rule-of-thumb’ 
methods in which managers identify task priorities using only these broad criteria without a formal 
system of scoring or ranking alternative tasks. As the most obvious priorities are addressed (e.g. 
the minefields blocking roads or where accidents occurred have all been cleared), and as the 
governments in mine-affected countries develop their capacities to oversee the mine action 
programme, rule-of-thumb approaches are less suitable for setting task priorities. Typically, the 
broad criteria are refined, with specific indicators are listed for each criterion to assist in assigning 
each DA to a broad priority category (e.g. level 1 priority for clearance), such as is illustrated 
below. Sometimes, systems are developed to calculate numeric scores for each alternative task. 
 
CRITERION/INDICATORS COMMENTS 
Criterion 1 – risk reduction  
There has been a recent accident in this DA (Yes/No) If yes, level 1 priority 
The DA is adjacent to residential areas or roads/paths  Level 1 or 2 priority 
The DA is within a regularly used area Level 2 priority. 
Criterion 2 – promote development  
The DA is blocking the reconstruction of infrastructure etc. 
AND there is no other constraint blocking that reconstruction 
project 
Level 1 priority (if there is 
another constraint, put on 
‘watch list’**) 
The DA is blocking a new investment in infrastructure etc. 
AND there is no other constraint blocking that development 
project AND a relocation of the investment to a safe site would 
not be technically or economically feasible  
Level 1 priority (if there is 
another constraint, put on 
‘watch list’**) 
The DA is blocking a private investment that will create jobs 
AND there is no other constraint blocking that development 
project AND a relocation of the investment to a safe site would 
not be technically or economically feasible 
Level 1 or 2 priority 
(depending on number of 
jobs – if there is another 
constraint, put on ‘watch list’) 
Criterion 3 – reduce poverty  
The DA is blocking assets which are essential* for a number 
of households.  
Level 1 priority 
The DA is blocking assets which are essential* for a single 
household.  
Level 2 priority 
The DA is blocking safe use of significant areas of a 
community’s crop land 
Level 2 priority 
The DA is blocking safe use of significant areas of a 
community’s grazing land or forests 
Level 3 priority 
* Essential means that the households cannot sustain themselves in that location without access to the 
blocked asset. 
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** Tasks on the ‘watch list’ are not worth clearing in the medium-term unless the constraint being monitored 
changes. For example, if a DA is blocking a potential road reconstruction project, but no donor funds have 
been obtained for the project, then clearance of the DA is not a priority. Once donor funds are obtained for 
starting the reconstruction project within the short-term, the DA would move from the ‘watch list’ to ‘class 1 
priority’. 
N1
 – Some clearance may also be motivated by treaty obligations (to clear all known minefields), and this 
may become a more important criterion as the ten-year deadline approaches for first States Parties to the 
Ottawa Treaty.  
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Updated Assessment of the EOD Capacity 
 
KPC has seven teams cross-trained in mine clearance, BAC, technical survey, and community 
liaison. The MAT has two 10 person technical survey teams,60 who can also conduct EOD, 
BAC, and small mine clearance operations. The current plans are for the MAT teams to 
remain in Kosovo through the current year. 
 
KPC is expanding capacity in a number of ways. Most obviously, it is training a number of 
additional personnel for survey and clearance operations.61 As well, the EOD teams are being 
restructured somewhat so half-teams can be assigned to work with other EOD teams. This 
means that only half a team will be held-back from clearance operations to be on-hand to 
respond to EOD call-outs.62 As outlined in the table below, these changes represent an 
increase in clearance capacity of roughly 60% relative to 2006.63, 64  
 
Table 3 – Increase in KPC clearance capacity 
 2006 2007 % change 
All KPC personnel, of which 109 133 +22% 
KPC field personnel, of which 94 118 +26% 
Full time on clearance activities  59 82 +41% 
Less: on call-out duty -8 -4  
Plus: MRE (1/2 time on clearance) 0 3  
Total available on clearance 51 81 +61% 
 
Other capacity enhancement measures are planned or underway. Later this year, all KPC EOD 
personnel will receive EOD level 3 training, allowing them to deal safely with larger 
munitions. As well, OKPCC will assess the feasibility of contracting mine detection dog 
(MDD) teams from Bosnia (the U.S. Department of State has already agreed in principle to 
finance this if the assessment is positive).  
 
It also is clear that OKPCC, supported by MAT in some areas, has significant capacity. As 
detailed earlier in this report, OKPCC personnel made excellent progress in implementing the 
recommendations arising from the last GICHD mission in August. On top of this, OKPCC 
and MAT personnel were able to make preliminary visits to 51 (88%) of 58 of the sites 
mentioned in Failing the Kosovars – this in a period of about two months or less, which 
reflects the fact that Kosovo is small and most of the DAs are clustered in a few areas. 
  
Representatives from both OKPCC and MAT said they were confident they would be able to 
conduct the required follow-up assessments to these and any other suspected DAs identified 
by the HALO Trust during 2007. These assessments will generate a clearer picture of the 
contamination problem and allow recommendations roughly as follows: 
 
1) No significant change in plans is required, OR 
 
2) Plans have to be adjusted as follows: 
                                                
60
 MAT was contracted to assist OKPCC in technical survey and in capacity development for the KPC.  
61
 Twenty-four new personnel are being trained, along with six MRE officers who will in future work on 
clearance when not required for MRE. 
62
 Until now, full teams provided the EOD response call-out capability. In 2006, KPC received 142 call-outs; an 
average of just over one call-out every two days.  
63
 In addition, the ability to assign half-teams to work temporarily with other teams provides greater flexibility. 
64
 This comparison does not include the loss of HALO Trust demining assets (principally, 89 deminers). 
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a) EITHER existing and planned KPC capacities will need to maintained for a 
longer period to address the contamination, OR 
b) KPC capacities will need to be further augmented to address the contamination 
within the planned period. 
 
Ideally, this recommendation should be based on a multi-year plan, which does not yet exist. 
We return to this issue in the following section following a brief discussion of HALO Trust’s 
2006 proposal to use its own sources of finance to maintain its demining teams to complete 
clearance more quickly.65 
 
In brief, the HALO Trust proposed to allocate funds it has raised from its own donors to 
maintain its demining teams in Kosovo. On the face of it, this would allow the remaining 
clearance to be done more quickly, whatever the true extent of the contamination problem 
proves to be. Even if the impact of the contamination in Kosovo is modest, as it appears to be, 
a more rapid reduction of that impact would be good for Kosovo and, particularly, for people 
living or working in the areas still affected by contamination.66 
 
On the other hand, experience worldwide shows clearly that the overall performance of a 
mine action programme depends on far more than the collective demining capacities of the 
operators. Clear strategic direction is needed to identify priorities. Effective cooperation is 
also required if the collective resources are to be allocated in line with the priorities identified. 
 
It is clear to the Assessment Team that relations between the HALO Trust and both OKPCC 
and UNMAS have been strained since at least the exit of the UNMIK MACC in December 
2001.67 If anything, relations appear to have deteriorated over the past year or more, as 
evinced by the sometimes incendiary language in correspondence among the organisations. 
As well, the staff of the EOD Management Section in OKPCC reported to the Assessment 
Team that their dealings with HALO personnel took significant amounts of time and typically 
led to outcomes that satisfied neither party. Clearly, the requisite level of trust for effective 
cooperation at either headquarters or operational levels does not exist at this point in time.  
 
                                                
65
 See Failing the Kosovars, p. 13 and ‘Strategy’ letter from Guy Willoughby to Maxwell Gaylard and General 
Chris Steirn, 7 September 06. 
66
 It could be argued that the funds available to HALO Trust should be allocated to countries more heavily 
impacted than Kosovo, but exploration of this question is, of course, beyond our TORs  
67
 See, for example, Time bombs: Landmines in Kosovo, The Economist, 5 September 2002. 
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Enhancing Planning and Local Ownership 
 
The Evaluation Team believes that it would be an appropriate time for OKPCC to develop a 
multi-year strategic plan for mine action in Kosovo. This would be an excellent vehicle for 
summarising the work done to date and the latest information on the remaining contamination 
problem, which would then provide a basis for: 
 
• an analysis of the alternative strategies for addressing that problem over the medium 
term,  
• a recommendation on the strategy that should be adopted, and  
• the concrete measures needed to implement the recommended strategy.  
 
In addition, a multi-year strategic plan would provide an opportunity to assess the 
implications of the Kosovo Status Settlement on the mine action programme and, in 
particular, on its continued transition to local ownership. Such a plan would also provide a 
framework for annual work plans and allow better tracking of progress over the medium 
term.68 Finally, a multi-year strategy would allow self government authorities to assess the 
financial implications of alternative strategies over the medium-term, which is consistent with 
on-going reforms to the overall planning and budgeting systems.69 This is particularly 
appropriate as much of the funding for mine action has been coming from the Kosovo 
Consolidated Budget.  
 
Table 4 – Financial contributions from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (EURO) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Wages & salaries      384,565      384,565       384,565      472,563 
Goods & services 485,860 341,826 359,641 363,182 
Total 870,424 726,391 744,205 835,745 
 
At the present time, a number of joint organs (i.e. PISG-international community) exist to 
consider policies and plans before these are submitted for final approval to the SRSG and/or 
the PISG. The relevant organ for mine action is now the Kosovo Transitional Security 
Working Group. The strategic and annual plans should be endorsed by it or its successor 
organ before being submitted to the self government authorities and to the International 
Military Presence. 
 
                                                
68
 In the current situation, a clear strategic plan would also provide a means for mine action stakeholders to make 
an informed assessment of alternative proposals  such as have been put forward by the HALO Trust. 
69
 The Ministry of Economy and Finance has already introduced a Medium-Term Budget Framework and a 
Medium-Term Economic Framework to strengthen the economic management and budget planning functions. 
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Conclusions 
 
While the full extent of landmine and UXO contamination in Kosovo cannot be determined 
with precision at this time, and may prove greater than earlier anticipated. Accident statistics 
indicate that UXO and abandoned munitions pose a modest threat to the population, and that 
most accidents occur due to handling. The elimination of this threat requires not only 
clearance of cluster munitions and other UXO, but also the reduction of unofficial stockpiles 
of munitions in Kosovo which, in turn, would require an enhanced sense of security 
throughout Kosovo and its neighbouring states. 
 
No injuries to humans from landmines have been reported to OKPCC in over two years.  
 
The OKPCC EOD Management section has made excellent progress in implementing the 
recommendations contained in the GICHD report from September 2006. Due to its efforts, 
and through findings from the latest assessment, further opportunities for performance 
improvement have been identified. 
 
The OKPCC EOD Management section, assisted by the MAT, has also made significant 
progress in preliminary assessments of the suspected DAs reported by the HALO Trust. Its 
initial assessment is that the HALO Trust survey will not alter the contamination picture in a 
fundamental way, and that existing and planned capacities will be adequate to address 
Kosovo’s contamination problem over the medium term. This assessment cannot be 
considered definitive at this point, and further investigations will need to be conducted on 
most of the DAs reported by HALO, while clearance will certainly be required for some. 
 
Plans for the expansion of KPC EOD teams are now being implemented. As a result, KPC 
EOD capacity will increase by about 60% compared to 2006. In addition, the U.S. 
Department of State has agreed to finance a contract for MDD teams from Bosnia, assuming 
there are sufficient sites where dogs can be productively used. 
 
Given the strained relations between HALO Trust and both OKPCC and UNMAS, it is hard 
to gauge the net benefits that might accrue had HALO Trust continued demining operations in 
Kosovo. The additional demining capacities would help, but the lack of a common vision, 
strategy, and purpose would be a hindrance unless these can be overcome.  
 
The Kosovo mine action plan lacks a multi-year strategic plan which, among other things, 
complicates the analysis of alternative proposals over a medium-term. In addition, the annual 
work plans are very brief, which (among other things) makes it difficult  to determine from 
the otherwise valuable annual reports whether the objectives set for the year were achieved. 
 
Opportunities exist for bolstering local ownership in preparation for an eventual transfer of 
responsibility for the mine action programme to self-government authorities in Kosovo. One 
important step would be the submission of strategic and annual work plans to these authorities 
for endorsement. 
 
All plans are based on critical assumptions, and the continued validity of these assumptions 
should be monitored. The multi-year strategic plan should state clearly any critical 
assumptions and make provision for monitoring their continued validity. The annual work 
plans should include monitoring of critical assumptions used in planning, in addition to 
sections on survey, clearance, MRE, community liaison, survivor assistance, accidents, and so 
forth. 
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Annex A: Terms of Reference 
 
The Terms of Reference were simply to: 
 
• conduct an assessment on the progress the OKPCC EOD Management section has 
made in implementing the 35 recommendations from the earlier mission undertaken in 
July-August 2006;70 
• review Failing the Kosovars – a report issued by the HALO Trust in December 2006 
detailing their findings to that point from a rapid survey of mine and UXO affected 
regions of Kosovo – and to recommend steps the OKPCC might consider to address 
the issues raised in that report; 
• write a report documenting findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 
 
 
                                                
70
 These 35 recommendations are listed in the next Appendix and are not repeated here. 
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Annex B: List of Persons Met 
 
Organisation/Body Position Name Contact details 
European Union Political Advisor Wolfgang Koeth wolfgang.koeth@ec.europa.eu  
OSCE Deputy Head of 
Mission 
Jens Modvig, MD 
PhD 
jens.modvig@osce.org  
UNMIK Strategy Coordinator Bryan Hopkinson hopkinson@un.org 
Director of Kosovo 
Consolidate Budget 
Agim Krasniqi akrasniqi@mfe-ks.org PISG (Kosovo 
authorities) 
Security Advisor to 
the Prime Minister 
Rame Arifaj rame.arifaj@ks-gov.net  
US Department of 
State, Pristina 
Political Officer Tracey Thornton thorntontr@state.gov  
Programme Manager 
Kosovo 
Edward Rowe halokosovo@ipko.net 
Kosovo Desk Officer Matthew Hovell mail@halotrust.org 
The HALO Trust 
IMSMA Officer Luan Jaupi 044 477 044 
MAT Programme Manager Mika Toivonen info@minesawareness.org 
toivonen.mika@gmail.com 
MAT Operations Officer Artur Tigani info@minesawareness.org 
Coordinator Major General Chris 
Steirn 
steirn@un.org 
Head Operations and 
Training 
Henri Winckler winckler@un.org 
OKPCC 
Military Assistant to 
the KPC Coordinator 
Major Greville 
Ramsay 
ramsay@un.org  
Chief EOD 
Management Section 
Ahmet Sallova sallova@un.org 
QA Officer Musa Sapiu  
OKPCC EOD 
Management section 
MRE Officer Rajmonda Thaqi  
Chief Ops HQ Colonel Idriz 
Shabani 
 
Commander, 
demining battalion 
Lt Col Nexhat Misini  
KPC 
Chief Instructor Lt Mustafa Kryeziu  
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Annex C: Detailed Review of the Progress in Implementing 
Recommendations 
 
The recommendations of the 2006 report are listed below in italics.  
 
General Recommendations 
 
Rec 1: OKPCC EOD should task KPC to conduct surveys at the locations summarized in 
Annex C of this report. 
 
This recommendation has been met. The details are described below. 
 
Annex C identified areas for re-survey following the review of the Task Dossiers, an update is 
provided in the right column: 
 
Table 5 – Areas requiring re-survey 
 SN TD/DA Priority Update 
1 43 S 24 – 05 / 548 No Discreditation, area is 
used by locals 
2 45 E 07 – 41 / 284 et al  Yes (Leskovica) Survey process started 
2006 and ongoing 
3 117 E 07 – 49 / 187, 188 Yes (Krivenik) Survey process started in 
2006 and ongoing 
 
Further, Annex C recommended community liaison and survey of the following places, with 
an update described below each location:  
 
 Gjocaj (near Junik) 
 
A survey has been conducted. Survey means for this and subsequent cases: research, visits, 
meetings, information of authorities about completions and reporting procedures. Result: The 
area is a known DA, which has been listed on the Future Task list. 
 
 Jasicq (near Junik) 
 
A survey has been conducted. Result: This area is the same as the one mentioned above for 
Gjocaj. 
 
 Dimce (FYROM border near Deneral Jankovic) 
 
A survey has been conducted. Result: Further survey required. 
 
 Nerodime village (Ferizaj Municipality, hilltops Rrafshi I Kodres se Madhe and 
Kodra e Shullanit 
 
A survey has been conducted. Result: Discreditation, the area had been cleared. Community 
liaison conducted. 
 
 Kalaja Fortress (river junction to Maja, Ferizaj Municipality) 
 
This is the same area as the one mentioned above. 
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 Irznic (near Decane) 
 
A survey has been conducted. Result: Outstanding technical survey task. 
 
 Milaj (Prizren Municipality) 
 
A survey has been conducted. Result: This is DA 4308 on the future task list. This is not a 
new DA. It is also listed below as the sixth item in Table 7 – Added future tasks from 
IMSMA. 
 
It was also recommended that KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb 
community in Lipljan has concerns about UXO. As a result, KFOR has been informed, but at 
the same time KPC and MAT already conducted surveys and subsequent clearance of 
graveyards in the area. No dangerous items have been found, and it needs to be seen as a 
particularly positive development that KPC do clearance in Serb areas without conflict and 
the Serb community accepts the work done. 
 
For the areas listed below, a reconfirmation of the priority had been asked for. An update for 
the tasks is provided in the right column. 
 
Table 6 – Reconfirmations of priority 
 SN TD / DA Type Surface 
cleared 
Priority Sub-
surface 
Update 
1 53 E25-58 / 1485 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
2 57 S20-18 / 2964 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list, Monitoring 
(KFOR area) 
3 62 S20-23 / 3994 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
4 70 E25-56 / 4032 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
5 100 W02-27 / 2723 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
6 102 S 20-04 / 3847 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
7 110 W02–49 (10 DAs) CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Future task list 
Low Priority, Monitoring 
 
The following DAs were tasks that were not listed in the OKPCC future task list, but were 
categorised as “Future Task” in IMSMA. For this reason it had been recommended to add 
them to the “Future Task” list. An update on the situation in these areas is provided in the 
right column: 
 
Table 7 – Added future tasks from IMSMA 
 DA IMSMA Status Remarks Update 
1 3943 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, MAT 
survey 2005 
Discredited 8/9/06 
2 2550 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, very low 
priority, no action now 
On future task list 
3 2756 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, low priority On future task list 
(same DA as SN 2) 
4 4325 Future Task CBU strike, MAT Completed 
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EOD Response survey 2003 
5 3880 Future Task Mines, HALO survey 
2005, priority 
Completed 28/11/06. 
6 4308 Future Task 
EOD Response 
Mines, MAT survey 
2003 
On 2007 task list  
 
 
Rec 2: OKPCC EOD / KPC should be more pro-active in order to ensure that they receive 
information on Dangerous Areas. This includes: 
 
Rec 3: Enhanced community liaison, especially collection of information on mine 
accidents with animals. 
 
See answer for recommendation below. 
 
Rec 4: Visits to Municipalities to ensure the DA reporting system is understood and 
working. 
 
This recommendation has been implemented, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process. 
This aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007. 
 
As an immediate reaction to these recommendations, OKPCC EOD sent out letters to the 
municipalities reminding them of the reporting system for suspected items and areas. The 
OKPCC EOD Liaison Officer also called the responsible authorities personally. Further, a 
meeting with the directorates of the civil emergency and response unit of each municipality 
was held by OKPCC EOD on 2 February 2007 in Pristina, at which all aspects dealing with 
requests from the population were addressed. This included procedures for a more formalised 
process of OKPCC response to municipality requests (e.g. copies of discreditation reports will 
be send back to the municipalities and not just to the affected person). As part of the survey 
process, municipalities were visited as well as communities. More activities are planned for 
this year. The communication lines are well established, which has been demonstrated by the 
fact that OKPCC EOD received calls from municipalities after HALO Trust approached them 
with mine related issues. 
 
Rec 5: Regular meetings with KFOR and OSCE staff to ensure the national DA reporting 
system is understood and working. 
 
This recommendations has been met, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process. This aspect 
is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007. 
 
OKPCC has a regular meeting with KFOR and OSCE at least once per month. The reporting 
procedures have been and will be stressed at each meeting. For new OSCE members, mine 
risk education is conducted and in the course of these briefings the reporting procedures are 
explained. 
 
Rec 6: Follow-up of the OSCE survey reports. 
 
This recommendations has been met. All areas reported through the OSCE survey reports 
have been followed up by OKPCC EOD (see also detailed descriptions under 
recommendation 1 above). The follow-up resulted in one additional, small-scale task. 
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Rec 7: Trawl for and find out all relevant information available within Demining 
Organisations collective staff memory. 
 
This recommendation has been met. MAT are still working closely with OKPCC EOD and all 
information is passed on. For the other organisations, see the recommendations below. 
 
Rec 8: Contact the Team Leader from HALO Trust who claims to have knowledge of 
minefields, and ensure that information is correctly processed. 
 
This recommendation has been met. OKPCC EOD interviewed HALO members including the 
specific Team Leader, Hasan Luma. The information suggested there was one additional 
minefield, which was followed up by MAT in 2006. No mines were found. During the 
interview process OKPCC EOD felt there was resistance to providing full information. 
 
Rec 9: A renewal of proactive communication with the Albanian Mine Action Centre 
(AMAC) and Danish Church Aid (DCA) about the situation on the Albanian border. 
 
This recommendation has been met. Meetings and telephone calls were arranged with Arben 
Braha, the director of the AMAC, and with Derek Frost, the programme manager of DCA. No 
new dangerous areas were reported, but an agreement was made that AMAC will send all 
completion reports from the border area to OKPCC EOD for information. The communication 
lines between AMAC and OKPCC EOD are well established. 
 
Rec 10: Continuation of the systematic survey process (ongoing since 1999). 
 
This recommendations has been met, as can be seen in the responses to the other 
recommendations, but needs to be seen as an ongoing process. This aspect is understood by 
OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007 
 
OKPCC EOD Operations should consider the following recommendations: 
 
Rec 11: Completing the ‘follow-up’ actions indicated in Table 2. 
 
This recommendation has been met so far as possible at this stage. In some cases, further 
work will be required (see tables in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task 
Dossiers” section of this annex). 
 
Rec 12: Up date the ‘master registry list’ of Task Dossiers so that the numerical sequence 
can be followed and all Task Dossiers be accounted for. 
 
This recommendation was not met, but a system has been established with a list of contents 
for the metal boxes holding task dossiers. Future action on this point should be seen as part of 
an overall plan for file/data management and quality assurance. This report contains 
recommendations regarding this point. 
 
Rec 13: The “Future Tasks” identified through the Task Dossier review and IMSMA 
research should be added to the “Future Task” list, as detailed in Annex C. 
 
This recommendation has been met. 
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Rec 14: Reconstitute the missing documents and Task Dossiers and assess them with the 
help of the developed review methodology. 
 
This recommendation has been met so far as possible. Some documents remain missing, as 
detailed in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers” section of this 
annex. If they are not found, the tasks should be added to a survey or community liaison list. 
 
Rec 15: Continue the review process of Task Dossiers with the help of the developed 
methodology, looking carefully for any inconsistencies between the task dossiers and 
IMSMA records. Create summarizing cover pages for each Task Dossier. Rather than 
compiling tables as in this Review Mission, make any IMSMA changes directly and 
document them. Also document which Task Dossiers have been reviewed. 
 
OKPCC EOD made impressive efforts to implement this recommendation. As a result, eight 
areas have been identified requiring further attention. Further work will be required, and new 
recommendations are provided in this report. 
 
Rec 16: Having undertaken the above step, cross-reference the DAs covered by all Task 
Dossiers to those in IMSMA and identify an accurate list of DAs that do not have an 
associated Task Dossier. Ensure that these too have been appropriately closed and 
documented. 
 
This recommendation has been met as far so possible, but further work will be required. This 
again refers to an overall solution for file/data management and quality assurance. 
 
Rec 17: Add the centralised survey reports and ‘ops memos’ to the individual Task 
Dossiers. 
 
This recommendations has been met.  
 
Rec 18: Link the information contained in “Operation Normal Life” to the Task Dossiers. 
 
This recommendation has been met. 
 
Rec 19: Improve the instructions from operations to the data entry clerk to ensure proper 
data transfer and an auditable record of decisions, for example by using written 
instructions– even if it is the same person. File the instructions for follow-up. 
 
This recommendation needs follow-up. It relates to the need for an overall plan for file/data 
management and quality assurance. See recommendations of this report. 
 
Rec 20: When using IMSMA for task identification, take the IMSMA ‘status’ as reference, 
not the IMSMA “confirmed clear” box. Ensure that all Dangerous Areas have a ‘status’ 
indicated in IMSMA and where not currently indicated that the status if reviewed before 
being entered. 
 
This recommendation is understood by OKPCC EOD, but needs follow-up to ensure data 
quality. 
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Rec 21: Create proper records before human memory moves on. Transfer all knowledge 
to the Task Dossiers, into IMSMA and record the process in Standard Work Procedures 
(SWP). 
 
This recommendation has been partly met. A file with forms and procedures has been 
presented to the assessment team. There are, however, some aspects missing such as data 
processing or the ones mentioned in the recommendation below. 
 
Rec 22: Write simple SWPs on such topics as Priority Setting and Reaction on Requests. 
There is a need to maintain an auditable record of management decisions. 
 
This recommendation has not yet been met, and should be in future.  
 
Rec 23: Apply the agreed revised nomenclature for the status of tasks. 
 
This recommendation has been met, random samples were checked in IMSMA. 
 
Rec 24: Consider differentiating between clearance requirement and low priority residual 
risk (action only when impact changes) for “Future Tasks”. 
 
This recommendation has been met in terms of planning, but it is not yet documented in the 
files or in IMSMA. The details how to proceed were agreed during this visit. A differentiation 
will be made between “Future Tasks” requiring survey or clearance and “Monitoring Tasks” 
which do not require clearance at this stage, but where monitoring is required on changes of 
the situation. This differentiation will be reflected in the Future Task list and in IMSMA. The 
term “Monitoring Tasks” will also be used for areas in which clearance has been conducted, 
but small areas remain for which clearance has not yet been possible for technical reasons. 
 
Rec 25: Re-assess impact of low priority DAs systematically. 
 
This recommendation has been met (see details in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses 
of Task Dossiers” section of this annex). 
 
Rec 26: Assess regularly if the status of ‘KFOR Responsibility’ tasks have changed. 
 
This recommendation has been met (see details in the “Follow-up of the Review and Analyses 
of Task Dossiers” section of this annex). 
 
Rec 27: Re-communicate Kosovo EOD reporting and communication lines regularly. 
 
This recommendations has been met, as described above, but needs to be seen as an ongoing 
process. This aspect is understood by OKPCC EOD, and is part of the plan for 2007. 
 
Rec 28: Consider writing a guideline on demolition drills for the use of SM systems. 
 
This recommendation has not been met, but should be in future because the OKPCC EOD 
guidelines are also the SOP for KPC. The guideline should be written in Albanian language. 
This task could be delegated to senior EOD staff of KPC. 
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Rec 29: Consider adopting the procedures developed in Lebanon for random minefields, 
if singular mines are found or accidents with human beings / animals are reported, 
(copies of procedures provided). 
 
This recommendation has been met. 
 
Rec 30: Document the human resource/equipment needs of KPC for the coming years. 
Specifically consider equipment maintenance and remote areas. 
 
This recommendation has not been met and points to the larger shortcoming in annual and 
multi-year planning. Recommendations in this regard are provided in this report. 
 
Rec 31: Search for the documents that record the operational follow-up of mine accidents 
that were not caused through tampering. 
 
The search for the documents is still ongoing. 
 
Rec 32: Create a workplan to implement these recommendations. 
 
OKPCC has presented a rough action plan based on the recommendations. It did not contain 
timelines, but as most of the recommendations have been addressed already, this is not a 
problem at this stage. 
 
Rec 33: OKPCC should discuss with OKPCC EOD the need for an office manager 
function to support the work of the EOD cell. The office manager would ensure proper 
internal management procedures, for example conduct quality assurance of filing/ 
documentation and IMSMA data entry, write SWPs etc. The need for a Community 
Liaison Officer as assistant to the Mine Risk Education Officer should also be assessed. 
 
This recommendation has been assessed, but there is a budget constraint. OKPCC EOD said 
that they would prefer a QA assistant if the budget allows only one new position. It needs to 
be ensured that proper quality management systems are established for data processing, entry 
and maintenance. 
 
Rec 34: In an endeavour to transfer responsibility to local capacity and built-up 
structures following the UN strategic goals for Kosovo, KPC should conduct as 
many of the identified tasks as possible, all of them co-ordinated through OKPCC. 
This includes KFOR EOD tasks, which would indicate the need for a senior EOD 
course for KPC. 
 
This recommendation has been met. There is close cooperation between OKPCC EOD and 
KPC. KPC has established a 24-hour EOD call-out system and, thus, is taking on more of the 
KFOR tasks. A senior EOD course is scheduled for March, funded through the Ministry of 
Defence of the United Kingdom.  
 
Rec 35: An external monitoring visit by UNMAS or an external organisation should be 
conducted once per year to ensure the implementation of the above mentioned 
recommendations. OKPCC should consider budgeting for this. 
 
The GICHD has conducted the 2007 monitoring visit resulting in this report. 
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Follow-up of the Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers 
 
Completeness of Task Dossier Documentation 
 
The Task Dossiers listed below were missing at the assessment in 2006. The column on the 
right provides an update on their location and status. 
 
Table 8 – Task dossiers missing during 2006 mission 
 Task Dossier Update 
1 S 24-14 Not found yet 
2 W 11-05 Not found yet 
3 W 17-18 Monitoring Task 
4 C 18-66 Active Task 
5 W 02-54 No action required 
6 N 11-05 Active Task 
7 N 27-07 Not found yet 
8 W 17-05 No action required 
9 W 08-12 No action required 
10 S 20-30 No action required 
11 W 02-28 No action required 
12 C 22-10 Dulje Pass 
13 W 02-37 Active 
 
Three Task Dossier have not been found yet, and one of those found has shifted into 
monitoring status. The Dulje Pass Task Dossier is frequently used at present due to the 
ongoing survey following the HALO report. The other eight Task Dossiers proved not be a 
problem or are active tasks as they had been before. 
 
Follow-up Document Research 
 
The Task Dossiers listed below have been identified to lack supporting documents. The 
column on the right provides an update on the status of the Task Dossiers. 
 
Table 9 – Missing documents 
 SN TD/DA Update 
1 31 S 20-32 / 900 Documents still missing 
2 33 S 24-31 / 4237 Documents still missing 
3 34 E 07-39 / 1662 Documents still missing 
4 51 W 01-13 / 3912 Documents still missing 
5 72 E 25-19 / 1333 Documents still missing 
6 101 S 05-25 / 2959 Documents still missing 
7 105 W 02-66 /2640, 2639 No more action required 
8 125 W 01-43 / 3277 Documents still missing 
9 126 W 01-43 / 3225 Documents still missing 
10 127 W 01-43 / 3242 Documents still missing 
11 128 W 01-43 / 1818 Documents still missing 
12 130 N 21 – 07 / 517 Documents still missing 
13 131 W 08 – 04 / 74 No more action required 
 
The table indicates that more work is required. If the documents remain missing,  the tasks 
should be re-surveyed if feasible. 
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Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA 
 
The Task Dossiers listed below showed discrepancies between the file and the information 
contained in IMSMA. The column on the right provides an update on the status of the tasks. 
 
Table 10 – Discrepancies between task dossiers & IMSMA 
 SN TD/DA Remarks Update 
1 53 E25-58 / 1485 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
Same DA as 2348, on future 
task list, monitoring 
2 57 S20-18 / 2964 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
KFOR responsibility, on  future 
task list, monitoring 
3 62 S20-23 / 3994 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
Survey September 2005, on 
future task list, monitoring 
4 70 E25-56 / 4032 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
On future task list, monitoring 
5 100 W02-27 / 
2723 
No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
On future task list, monitoring 
6 102 S20-04 / 3847 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
On future task list, monitoring 
7 103 S20-05 / 2048 Small areas uncleared due to high metal 
contamination not accurately recorded in 
IMSMA yet. Link other DAs to Completion 
Report. 
Not on future task list, will get 
on monitoring list 
8 104 C18-12 /  
2515,  
2516 
IMSMA status discredited, but area had 
been subsurface cleared. 
Subsurface clearance only 
documented 10 cm, on future 
task list, monitoring 
9 107 
108 
S24-02 /  
2322, 2560 
107 and 108 same DA area. Unite DAs in 
one TD, link DAs in IMSMA. Small 
uncleared/unclearable area left? 
Complete. If uncleared area is 
left, it will get on the monitoring 
list 
10 110 W2-49 
2337  
No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
On future task list, monitoring 
 
Analysis of Outstanding Tasks 
 
From previous UNMAS list: 
 
Table 11 – Outstanding tasks 
 TD Status 2006 Update 
1 C 19-12 Ongoing 2007 task 
2 C 19-34 Ongoing Completed 
3 S 24-29 Completed 1 DA completed, 1 2007 task 
4 E 09-07 Partly completed / Future Task 2007 task 
5 DA 4342 Completed end August --- 
6 W 01-36 Ongoing Completed 
7 W 01-46 Future Task On future task list 
8 W 01-48 Ongoing Completed 
9 C 09-12 Partly completed Future Task Completed 
10 C 09-13 Future Task On future task list 
11 C 13-18 Completed --- 
12 C 18-13 Future Task On future task list 
13 C 18-66 Ongoing 2007 task 
14 C 18-68 Future Task On future task list 
15 C 19-29 KFOR On future monitoring list 
16 C 19-35 UNHCR area On future task list for 2007 
17 C 22-11 Future Task On future task list for 2007 
18 N 11-05 Serb Army Task On future monitoring list 
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19 N 11-09 Future Task On future task list 
20 N 28-01 KFOR Task On future monitoring list 
21 N 29-01 Future Task On future task list 
22 DA 4317 Future Task On future task list 
23 S 16-08 Ongoing Completed 
24 S 20-12 Ongoing Completed 
25 S 20-42 If required Future Task On future monitoring list 
26 S 20-48 Ongoing On future task list 
27 DA 2538 Completed / EOD Response Completed 
28 E 25-25 KPC Training Area On future monitoring list 
29 W 01-10 Future Task On future task list 
30 W 01-47 Ongoing 2007 task 
31 W 02-27 Completed Monitoring 
32 W 02-32 Completed --- 
33 W 02-37 Future Task On future task list 
34 W 02-84 Ongoing On future task list 
35 W 02-86 Future Task On future task list 
36 W 17-16 Ongoing 2007 task 
37 W 17-22 If required Future Task On future monitoring list 
 
Following the recommendation of the previous GICHD report, OKPCC conducted a 
systematic review of all Task Dossiers and compared them with the data contained in 
IMSMA, in order to identify further areas for future action. As a result, twelve areas have 
been identified for further community liaison or survey, and the tasks listed below require 
further attention as described under “Remarks”: 
 
Table 12 – Results of complete task dossier review 
 SN TD / DA Type Surface 
cleared 
Priority Sub-
surface 
Remarks 
1 33 N 11-12 DA 
3975 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require full sub-
surface clearance in the future. 
Monitoring task. 
2 35 N11–13DA 
4180 DU 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require Tech. Survey 
in the future. Monitoring task. 
3 293 W 02-76 DA 
2350 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require 
T. Survey in the future 
4 442 C 18-12 DA 
2515 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require full sub-
surface clearance in the future. 
5 451 C 19-07 DA 
3936 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require full sub-
surface clearance in the future. 
6 526 C 22-12 DA 
3944 
CBU Strike Yes Low The area will require T. Survey in 
the future 
7 154 E 04-09 DA 
2608, 1541 
CBU Strike Yes Low 2608 subsurface clearance 
required 
8 610 DA 4307 MF Yes Low Requires further clearance 
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Annex D: Suggested Outline for Strategic Plan 
 
1. Context71 
a. Basic data on Kosovo 
b. The conflict & the international response 
c. Subsequent political developments and outlook 
 
2. Needs assessment 
a. Origin & extent of the contamination 
b. History and achievements of the mine action programme 
c. Description of the existing mine action programme 
d. Extent & nature of the remaining contamination72 
 
3. The strategy for addressing Kosovo’s needs 
a. Consultation process used in developing the strategy73 
b. Strategic issues to be addressed 
c. Analysis of strategic options 
d. Outline of the selected strategy 
e. Key assumptions and risk management measures 
 
4. Vision, strategic goals, and specific objectives for the mine action programme 
a. Vision 
b. Goals & Objectives 
i. Survey & Clearance 
ii. MRE 
iii. Survivor assistance 
iv. Stockpiles 
v. Kosovo and International Obligations 
c. Capacity development requirements 
i. Staff development 
ii. Research 
iii. Others??? 
 
5. Resource requirements 
a. Assets (EOD, survey, MRE, etc.) 
b. Financial 
i. recurrent budget requirements 
ii. schedule of investments required 
c. Source of funds (resource mobilisation) 
 
Appendices74 
 
                                                
71
 Most of this section can be taken from earlier reports. 
72
 It is critical to be clear about what the outcome of the HALO Trust survey has been. As it is unlikely that a 
final tabulation will be available, assumptions will need to be made AND clearly stated, for two reasons: 
• the strategy will be based, in part, on the assumptions on the ‘true’ level of contamination; and 
• the plan should incorporate specific steps needed to confirm or discredit those assumptions (to be 
outlined under 4.c.ii – Research) 
73
 Including representatives from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and from HALO Trust. 
74
 One should provide an account of the known extent of the contaminations since 2001 so it is clear whether we 
are ‘winning the war.’ See the file ‘Task Accounting.xls’ for a possible format. 
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